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TESTING AFFILIATION IN PRIVATE-VALUES MODELS OF
FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS USING GRID DISTRIBUTIONS
By Luciano I. de Castro and Harry J. Paarsch
Northwestern University and University of Melbourne
Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable em-
pirical model of equilibrium behavior at first-price auctions when
bidders’ valuations are potentially dependent, but not necessarily af-
filiated. We develop a test of affiliation and apply our framework to
data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions held by the Department of
Transportation in the State of Michigan to procure road-resurfacing
services: we do not reject the hypothesis of affiliation in cost signals.
1. Motivation and introduction. During the past half century, economists
have made considerable progress in understanding the theoretical structure
of equilibrium strategic behavior under market mechanisms, such as auc-
tions, when the number of potential participants is relatively small; see Kr-
ishna (2010) for a comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device, commonly used to describe bidder motivation at
single-object auctions, is a continuous random variable which represents
individual-specific heterogeneity in valuations. The conceptual experiment
involves each potential bidder’s receiving a draw from a distribution of valua-
tions. Conditional on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully,
maximizing either the expected profit or the expected utility of profit from
winning the auction. Another frequently-made assumption is that the val-
uation draws of bidders are independent and that the bidders are ex ante
symmetric—their draws being from the same distribution of valuations. This
framework is often referred to as the symmetric independent private-values
paradigm (symmetric IPVP). Under these assumptions, a researcher can
then focus on a representative agent’s decision rule when describing equilib-
rium behavior.
At many real-world auctions, the latent valuations of potential bidders
are probably dependent in some way. In auction theory, it has been as-
sumed that dependence satisfies affiliation, a term coined by Milgrom and
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Weber (1982). Affiliation is a condition concerning the joint distribution of
signals. Often, affiliation is described using the intuition presented by Mil-
grom and Weber: “roughly, this [affiliation] means that a high value of one
bidder’s estimate makes high values of the others’ estimates more likely.”
Thus described, affiliation seems like a relatively innocuous condition. In
the case of continuous random variables, following the path blazed by Kar-
lin (1968), some refer to affiliation as multivariate total positivity of order
two, or MTP2 for short. Essentially, under affiliation, with continuous ran-
dom variables, the off-diagonal elements of the Hessian of the logarithm of
the joint probability density function of signals are all nonnegative, that
is, the joint probability density function is log-supermodular. Under joint
normality of signals, affiliation requires that all the pair-wise covariances be
weakly positive.
How is affiliation related to other forms of dependence? Consider two
continuous random variables V1 and V2, having joint probability density
function fV1,V2(v1, v2) as well as conditional probability density functions
fV2|V1(v2|v1) and fV1|V2(v1|v2) and conditional cumulative distribution func-
tions FV2|V1(v2|v1) and FV1|V2(v1|v2). Introduce g(·) and h(·), functions that
are nondecreasing in their arguments. de Castro (2007) has noted that af-
filiation implies (a) [FV2|V1(v2|v1)/fV2|V1(v2|v1)] is decreasing in v1 (and v2
in the other case), often referred to as a decreasing inverse hazard rate,
which implies (b) Pr(V2 ≤ v2|V1 = v1) is nonincreasing in v1 (and v2 in the
other case), also referred to as positive regression dependence, which im-
plies (c) Pr(V2 ≤ v2|V1 ≤ v1) is nonincreasing in v1 (and v2 in the other
case), also referred to as left-tail decreasing in v1 (v2), which implies (d)
cov[g(V1, V2), h(V1, V2)] is positive, which implies that (e) cov[g(V1), h(V2)]
is positive, which implies (f) cov(V1, V2) is positive. The important point to
note is that affiliation is a much stronger form of dependence than positive
covariance. In addition, de Castro (2007) has demonstrated that, within the
set of all signal distributions, the set satisfying affiliation is small, both in
the topological sense and in the measure-theoretic sense.
Affiliation delivers several predictions and results: first, under affiliation,
the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE)
is guaranteed. Also, four commonly-studied auction formats—the oral,
ascending-price (often referred to by economists as the English) and the
second-price, sealed-bid (often referred to by economists as the Vickrey)
as well as two first-price ones—can be ranked in terms of the revenues
they can be expected to generate. Specifically, the expected revenues at En-
glish auctions are weakly greater than those at Vickrey auctions which are
greater than those at first-price auctions—either the sealed-bid or the oral,
descending-price (often referred to by economists as the Dutch) formats.
Note, however, that when bidders are asymmetric, their valuation draws be-
ing from different marginal distributions, these rankings no longer apply. In
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fact, in general, very little can be said about the revenue-generating prop-
erties of the various auction formats and pricing rules under asymmetries.
Empirically investigating equilibrium behavior at auctions when latent
valuations are affiliated has challenged researchers for some time. Laffont
and Vuong (1996) showed that identification has been impossible to estab-
lish in many models when affiliation is present. In fact, Laffont and Vuong
demonstrated that any model within the affiliated-values paradigm (AVP)
is observationally equivalent to a model within the affiliated private-values
paradigm (APVP). For this reason, virtually all empirical workers who have
considered some form of dependence have worked within the APVP.
Only a few researchers have dealt explicitly with models within the APVP.
In particular, Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) have demonstrated nonpara-
metric identification within the conditional IPVP, a special case of the
APVP, while Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) have demonstrated nonparamet-
ric identification within the APVP. One of the problems that Li et al. faced
when implementing their approach is that nonparametric kernel-smoothed
estimators are often slow to converge. In addition, Li et al. do not impose
affiliation in their estimation strategy, so the first-order condition used in
their two-step estimation strategy need not constitute an equilibrium. Hub-
bard, Li and Paarsch (2009) have sought to address some of these technical
problems using semiparametric methods which sacrifice the full generality
of the nonparametric approach in lieu of additional structure.
To date, except for Brendstrup and Paarsch (2007), no one has attempted
to examine, empirically, models in which the private values are potentially
dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. Incidentally, using data from se-
quential English auctions of two different objects, Brendstrup and Paarsch
found weak evidence against affiliation in the valuation draws of two objects
for the same bidder.
de Castro (2007) has noted that, within the private-values paradigm, affil-
iation is unnecessary to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a MPSE.
In fact, he has demonstrated existence and uniqueness of a MPSE under a
weaker form of dependence, one where the inverse hazard rate is decreasing
in the conditioned argument.
Because affiliation is unnecessary to guarantee existence and uniqueness
of bidding strategies in models of first-price auctions with private values,
expected revenue predictions based on empirical models in which affiliation
is imposed are potentially biased. Knowing whether valuations are affili-
ated is central to ranking auction formats in terms of the expected revenues
generated. In the absence of affiliation, the expected-revenue rankings deliv-
ered by the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982) need not hold:
the expected-revenue rankings across auctions formats remain an empiri-
cal question. Thus, investigating the empirical validity of affiliation appears
both an important and a useful exercise.
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In next section of this paper we present a brief description of affiliation
and its soldier—total positivity of order two (TP2). Subsequently, following
the theoretical work of de Castro (2007, 2008), who introduced the notion of
the grid distribution, in Section 3 we construct a tractable empirical model
of equilibrium behavior at first-price auctions when the private valuations of
bidders are potentially dependent, but not necessarily affiliated.1 In Section
4 we develop a test of affiliation, which is based on grid distributions, rather
than kernel-smoothing methods, thus avoiding the drawback encountered
by Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, 2002), while in Section 5 we apply our
methods in an empirical investigation of low-price, sealed-bid, procurement-
contract auctions held by the Department of Transportation in the State of
Michigan, and do not reject the null hypothesis of affiliation.
This information is potentially useful to a policy maker. The apparent
high degree of estimated affiliation also explains why low levels of observed
competition are often sufficient to maintain relatively low profit margins:
strong affiliation is akin to fierce competition. Under strong affiliation, a
potential winner knows that his nearest competitor probably has a valuation
(cost) close to his, and this disciplines his bidding behavior: he becomes more
aggressive than under independence. We summarize and conclude in Section
6, the final section of the paper. The results of a small-scale Monte Carlo to
investigate the numerical as well as small-sample properties of our proposed
test are reported in the supplemental document—de Castro and Paarsch
(2010).
2. Affiliation andTP2. As mentioned above, affiliation is often described
using an example with two random variables that can take on either a low
or a high value. The two random variables are affiliated if high (low) values
of each are more likely to occur than high and low or low and high values. A
commonly-used graph of the four possible outcomes in a two-bidder auction
game with two values is depicted in Figure 1. The (1,1) and (2,2) points are
more likely than the (2,1) or (1,2) points. Letting pij denote the probability
of (i, j), affiliation in this example then reduces to TP2—viz.,
p11p22 ≥ p12p21.
Put another way, TP2 means that the determinant of the matrix
P=
(
p11 p12
p21 p22
)
1The grid distributions discussed and used in this paper can also be modeled as con-
tingency tables, which have been used extensively in applications in the social sciences;
see Douglas et al. (1990) for the connections between contingency tables and positive
dependence properties, including affiliation (TP2), which is the focus of this paper.
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Fig. 1. Affiliation with two bidders and two values for signals.
must be weakly positive. Independence in valuations obviously satisfies the
lower bound on this determinental inequality. Note, too, that affiliation re-
stricts distributions to a part of the simplex depicted in Figure 2. In that
figure, it is the region of the simplex that appears below a semi-circle rising
from the line where p11 + p22 equals one. In order to draw this figure, we
needed to impose symmetry, so p12 and p21 are equal; thus, the intercept
for p12 is one half. Conditions that are weaker than affiliation, but that also
guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, are depicted in Figure 2,
too. In fact, in this simple example, the entire simplex satisfies these weaker
conditions. In richer examples, however, it is a subset of the simplex, but
one that contains the set of affiliated distributions. Thus, the assumption
of affiliation could be important in determining the revenues a seller can
expect from a particular auction format.
Slavkovic´ and Fienberg (2009) have discussed geometric representations
of 2× 2 distributions, like some of those considered here. Their representa-
tions are based on tetrahedrons, while ours reduce to triangles because of
symmetry.
Another important point to note is that affiliation is a global restriction.
To see the importance of this fact, introduce the valuation 3 for each bidder;
five additional points then appear, as is depicted in Figure 3. Affiliation
requires that the probabilities at all collections of four points satisfy TP2;
that is, the following additional six inequalities must hold:
p12p23 ≥ p13p22, p22p33 ≥ p23p32, p21p32 ≥ p22p31,
p11p33 ≥ p13p31, p12p33 ≥ p13p32 and p21p33 ≥ p23p31.
Of course, symmetry would imply that pij equal pji for all i and j, so the
joint mass function for two bidders and three valuations under symmetric
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Fig. 2. Probability set: affiliation and alternative.
Fig. 3. Affiliation with two bidders and three values for signals.
affiliation can be written as the following matrix:
P=

p11 p12 p13p21 p22 p23
p31 p32 p33

=

a d ed b f
e f c

 ,
where the determinants of all (2× 2) submatrices must be positive. Note,
too, that all the points must also live on the simplex, so
0≤ a, b, c, d, e, f < 1 and a+ b+ c+2d+2e+ 2f = 1.
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How many inequalities are relevant? Let us represent the above matrix in
the following tableau:
1 2 3
1 a d e
2 d b f
3 e f c
where the row and column numbers will be used later to define TP2 inequal-
ities. There are
(3
2
)
×
(3
2
)
or nine possible combinations of four cells—that
is, nine inequalities. However, by symmetry, three are simply duplicates of
others. The following tableau represents all of the inequalities:
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
(1,2) ab≥ d2 af ≥ de df ≥ be
(1,3) af ≥ de ac≥ e2 dc≥ ef
(2,3) df ≥ be dc≥ ef bc≥ f2
where (i, j)× (ℓ,m) means form a matrix with elements from rows i and j
and columns ℓ and m of the first tableau. Observe that when the three in-
equalities highlighted in bold are satisfied, all others will be also satisfied. In
fact, the inequality (1,3)×(1,2) :af ≥ de derives from (1,2)×(1,2) :ab ≥ d2
and (2,3)× (1,2) :df ≥ be. Finally, inequality (2,3)× (1,3) :dc≥ ef derives
from the other two, previously established—viz., (2,3)× (1,2) :df ≥ be and
(2,3)× (2,3) : bc≥ f2. All other inequalities can be obtained from the adja-
cent ones in this fashion.
Adding values to the type spaces of bidders expands the number of deter-
minental restrictions required to satisfy TP2, thus restricting the space of
distributions that can be entertained. Likewise, adding bidders to the game,
particularly if the bidders are assumed symmetric, also restricts the space of
distributions that can be entertained. For example, suppose a third bidder
is added, one who is symmetric to the previous two. The probability mass
function for triplets of values (v1, v2, v3), where vn = 1,2,3 and n = 1,2,3,
can be represented as an array whose slices can then be represented by
the following three matrices for bidders 1 and 2, indexed by the values of
bidder 3:
P1 =

a d ed b f
e f c

 , P2 =

 d b fb h g
f g i

 and P3 =

 e f cf g i
c i j

 .
In general, if the number of bidders is N and the number of values is k, then,
without symmetry or affiliation, probability arrays have (kN − 1) unique el-
ements. Also, de Castro (2008) has shown that symmetry reduces this to
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(
k+N−1
k−1
)
elements, while affiliation restricts where these
(
k+N−1
k−1
)
probabil-
ities can live on the simplex via the determinental inequalities required by
TP2. It is well known that a function is MTP2 (affiliated), if and only if, it
is TP2 in all relevant collections of four points. As an aside, in this three-
by-three example, only nine constraints are relevant—viz.,
ab≥ d2, bc≥ f2, df ≥ be, dh≥ b2, hi≥ g2,
bg ≥ fh, eg ≥ f2, gj ≥ i2 and fi≥ cg.
If these hold, then the remainder are satisfied, too. Knowing the maximum
number of binding constraints is relevant later in the paper when we discuss
our test statistic.
Consider now the random N -vector V which equals (V1, . . . , VN ), having
joint density (mass) function fV with realization v equal to (v1, . . . , vN ).
Affiliation can be formally defined as follows: for all v and v′, the random
variables V are said to be affiliated if
fV(v ∨ v
′)fV(v ∧ v
′)≥ fV(v)fV(v
′),
where
(v ∨ v′) = [max(v1, v
′
1),max(v2, v
′
2), . . . ,max(vN , v
′
N )]
denotes the component-wise maxima of v and v′, sometimes referred to as
the join, while
(v ∧ v′) = [min(v1, v
′
1),min(v2, v
′
2), . . . ,min(vN , v
′
N )]
denotes the component-wise minima, sometimes referred to as the meet.
3. Theoretical model. We develop our theoretical model within the private-
values paradigm, assuming away any interdependencies. We consider a set
N of bidders {1,2, . . . ,N}. Now, bidder n is assumed to draw Vn, his private
valuation of the object for sale, from the closed interval [v, v]. We note that,
without loss of generality, one can reparametrize the valuations from [v, v]
to [0,1]. Below, we do this. We collect the valuations in the vector v which
equals (v1, . . . , vN ) and denote this vector without the nth element by v−n.
Here, we have used the now-standard convention that upper-case letters
denote random variables, while lower-case ones denote their corresponding
realizations. Note, too, that V lives in [0,1]N .
We assume that the values are distributed according to the probability
density function fV : [0,1]
N →R+ which is symmetric; that is, for the permu-
tation ϕ :{1, . . . ,N} → {1, . . . ,N}, we have fV(v1, . . . , vN ) equals fV(vϕ(1),
. . . , vϕ(N)). Letting fn(vn) denote the marginal probability density function
of Vn, we note that it equals
∫ 1
0 · · ·
∫ 1
0 fV(v−n, vn)dv−n. [Below, we constrain
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ourselves to the case where fn(·) is the same for all n, but this is unnec-
essary and done only because, when we come to apply the method, we do
have not enough information to estimate the case with varying fn’s.] Our
main interest is the case when fV is not the product of its marginals—the
case where the types are dependent. We denote the conditional density of
V−n given vn by
fV−n|Vn(v−n|vn) =
fV(v−n, vn)
fn(vn)
.
Finally, we denote the largest order statistic of V−n given vn by Zn and its
probability density and cumulative distribution functions by f(zn|vn) and
F (zn|vn), respectively.
We assume that bidders are risk neutral and abstract from a reserve
price. Given his value vn, bidder n tenders a bid sn ∈ R+. If his tender
is the highest, then bidder n wins the object and pays what he bid. A pure
strategy is a function σ : [0,1]→ R+ which specifies the bid σ(vn) for each
value vn. The interim pay-off of bidder n, who bid sn when his opponents
follow σ : [0,1]→R+, is
Π(vn, sn, σ) = (vn − sn)
∫ σ−1(sn)
v
f(zn|vn)dzn = (vn − sn)F [σ
−1(sn)|vn].
We focus on symmetric, increasing pure-strategy equilibria (PSE) which are
defined by σ : [0,1]→R+ such that
Π[vn, σ(vn),σ−n]≥Π(vn, s,σ−n) ∀s, vn.
As mentioned above, in most theoretical models of auctions that admit
dependence in valuation draws, researchers have assumed that fV satisfies
affiliation. We do not restrict ourselves to fV’s that satisfy affiliation. We
assume only that fV belongs to a set of distributions P which guarantees
the existence and uniqueness of a MPSE. This set P was fully characterized
by de Castro (2008) in the particular case of grid distributions, which are
considered in our Assumption 4.1, below.
Let C denote the set of continuous density functions fV : [0,1]
N →R+ and
let A denote the set of affiliated probability functions. For convenience and
consistency with the notation used in later sections, we include in A the set
of all affiliated probability functions, not just the continuous ones. Endow C
with the topology of the uniform convergence—that is, the topology defined
by the norm of the supremum
‖fV‖= sup
v∈[0,1]N
|fV(v)|.
Let D be the set of probability functions fV : [0,1]
N →R+ and assume there
is a measure µ over it.
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We now introduce a transformation Tk :D→D which is the workhorse of
our method. To define Tk, let I : [0,1]→{1,2, . . . , k} denote the function that
associates to v ∈ [0,1] the ceiling ⌈kv⌉—viz., the smallest integer at least as
large as kv. Thus, for each v ∈ [0,1], we have v ∈ ( I(v)−1
k
, I(v)
k
]. Similarly, let
S(v) denote the “square” (hypercube)
∏N
n=1(
I(vn)−1
k
, I(vn)
k
] where v collects
(v1, v2, . . . , vN ) ∈ [0,1]
N . From this, we define Tk :D→D as the transforma-
tion that associates to each fV ∈D the probability density function T
k(fV)
given by
T
k(fV)(v) = k
N
∫
S(v)
fV(u)du.
Observe that Tk(fV) is constant over each square
∏N
n=1(
mn−1
k
, mn
k
], for all
combinations of mn ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The term k
N above derives from the fact
that each square
∏N
n=1(
mn−1
k
, mn
k
] has volume (1/kN ). Note that for all prob-
ability density functions fV ∈ D, T
1(fV)(v) equals one for all v ∈ [0,1]
N ,
that is, T1(fV) is the uniform distribution on [0,1]
N .
We now need to introduce a compact notation to represent arrays of di-
mension
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k× k× · · · × k. We denote by Mk
N
the set of arrays and by [P]
an array in that set. When there are but two bidders, an array is obviously
just a matrix. In the application of this model to field data, which we de-
scribe in Section 5, N is three. The (i1, i2, . . . , iN )th element of an array
is denoted [P](i1, i2, . . . , iN ), or [P](i) for short, where i denotes the vector
(i1, i2, . . . , iN ). Now, I(v) = i if v ∈ (
i−1
k
, i
k
]. Thus, for k ∈ N, we define the
finite-dimensional subspace Dk ⊂D as
Dk = {fV ∈D :∃[P] ∈M
kN , fV(v) = [P][I(v1), . . . , I(vN )]}.
Observe that Dk is a finite-dimensional set. In fact, when N is two, a prob-
ability density function fV ∈D
k can be described by a (k× k) matrix P as
follows:
fV(v1, v2) = [P](i, j) if (v1, v2) ∈
(
i− 1
k
,
i
k
]
×
(
j − 1
k
,
j
k
]
(3.1)
for i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . , k}. The definition of fV at the zero measure set of points
{(v1, v2) = (
i
k
, j
k
) : i= 0 or j = 0} is arbitrary.
Note, too, that the width of the cells can be allowed to vary. For example,
one might be 0.3 wide, while the next one can be 0.2 wide, the third 0.1
wide, the next 0.25, and the last 0.15. In fact, the transformation can be
defined in terms of rectangles, instead of squares as above. To illustrate this,
consider again the symmetric case and introduce Figure 4. Let 0 = r0 < r1 <
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Fig. 4. Symmetric nonequi-spaced grid.
r2 < · · · < rk−1 < rk = 1 be an arbitrary partitioning of the interval [0,1].
2
Now, define I : [0,1]→ {1,2, . . . , k} by I(v) = j if and only if v ∈ (rj−1, rj ].
Define B(v) as the rectangle (box) where v collects (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ [0,1]
N lies.
Thus, B(v)≡
∏N
n=1(rI(vn)−1, rI(vn)]. Now, define
T
k
B(f
0
V)(v) =
∫
B(v) f
0
V
(u)du∫
B(v) du
.
The following theorem was proven by de Castro (2008):
Theorem 3.1. Let f0
V
be a symmetric and continuous probability den-
sity function. f0
V
is affiliated if and only if for all k, Tk
B
(f0
V
) is also affiliated.
In our notation,
f0V ∈A ⇔ T
k
B(f
0
V) ∈A ∀k ∈N
or
A=
⋂
k∈N
T
−k
B
(A∩Dk).
Why is this important? Well, in many applications, the set of hypercubes
defined by a large k will have many empty cells, which causes problems in
2We implicitly assume here that the r1 < · · ·< rk that form B become dense in [0,1] as
k increases.
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both estimation and inference. Thus, one may want to subdivide the space
of valuations irregularly, but symmetrically, as illustrated in Figure 4 when
N is two.
4. Test of affiliation. The key result from de Castro (2007) that allows us
to develop our test of symmetric affiliation is the following: if the true prob-
ability density function f0
V
exhibits affiliation, then Tk
B
(f0
V
), a discretized
version of it, will too. (See Theorem 3.1, above.) To the extent that the grid
distribution Tk
B
(f0
V
) can be consistently estimated from sample data, one
can then test whether the estimated grid distribution exhibits affiliation.
Of course, sampling error will exist, but presumably one can evaluate its
relative importance using first-order asymptotic methods.
Consider a sequence of T auctions indexed t= 1, . . . , T at which N bid-
ders participated by submitting the NT bids {{snt}
N
n=1}
T
t=1. We note that
affiliation is preserved under a monotonic transformation, so examining a
discretization of g0
S
(s), the true probability density function of bids under
the hypothesis of expected-profit maximizing equilibrium behavior, is the
same as examining f0
V
(v). Of course, neither f0
V
nor g0
S
is known. One can,
however, construct an estimate of Tk
B
(g0
S
) on the interval [0,1]N by first
transforming the observed bids according to
unt =
snt − s
s¯− s
, n= 1, . . . ,N and t= 1, . . . , T,
where s is the smallest observed bid and s¯ is the largest observed bid, and
then by breaking up this hypercube into L(= kN ) cells and counting the
number of times that a particular N -tuple falls in that cell.3 Now, the ran-
dom vector Y, which represents the number of outcomes that fall in each
of the cells and equals the vector (Y1, Y2, . . . , YL)
⊤, follows a multinomial
distribution having the joint probability mass function
gY(y|pi) =
T !
y1! · · ·yL!
L∏
ℓ=1
πyℓℓ ,
where πℓ equals Pr(Yℓ = yℓ), with yℓ = 0,1, . . . , T , while pi collects (π1, . . . , πL)
and lives on the simplex—viz., the set
SL = {pi|pi ≥ 0L, ι
⊤
Lpi = 1}
3We know that the support of g0S is strictly positive at σ
0(v), the true upper bound of
support of bids, and we assume that f0V is strictly positive at v, so g
0
S is strictly positive at
σ0(v), the true lower bound of support of bids. Consequently, the sample estimators of the
lower and upper bounds of support of S converge at rate T , which is faster than the rate
of convergence of sample averages—rate
√
T . Hence, when using sample averages in our
estimation, we can ignore this first-stage, pre-estimation error—at least under first-order
asymptotic analysis.
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with ιL being an (L× 1) vector of ones. Note, too, that ι
⊤y equals T , the
number of observations.
For ℓ= 1, . . . ,L, the unconstrained maximum-likelihood estimates of the
πℓ’s are the (yℓ/T )’s. To test for affiliation, maximize the following logarithm
of the likelihood function (minus a constant):
L(pi) = y⊤ log(pi)
subject to
(1) the vector pi lies in the simplex SL;
(2) all of the determinental inequalities required for TP2 hold.
Then compare this value of L with the unconstrained one.
While the determinental constraints required for TP2 are convex sets
of the parameters when the submatrices are symmetric, they are not for
general submatrices. However, by taking logarithms of both sides of any
general determinental inequality
ab≥ cd,
one can convert this into a linear inequality, which does give rise to con-
vex constraint sets, albeit in variables that are logarithms of the original
variables. To wit,
log a+ log b− log c− log d≥ 0
defines a convex set (in the transformed variables log a, . . . , log d). Of course,
the adding-up constraint for the simplex must be finessed—for example, by
considering the following:
exp(log a) + exp(log b) + exp(log c) + exp(log d) + · · · ≤ 1,
which gives rise to a convex set. Thus, the problem is almost a linear pro-
gramme.
For known N and fixed k, the specific steps involved in implementing the
test in this problem are the following. First, form the grid distribution of
the joint density as the unknown array [P]. Letting [E] denote the array of
counts for the grid distribution, the logarithm of the likelihood function for
this multinomial process is ∑
i
[E](i) log{[P](i)}.(4.1)
Now, the following inequalities must be met:
log{[P](i)} ≤ 0 and
∑
i
exp(log{[P](i)}) ≤ 1,(4.2)
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while symmetry requires the following linear restrictions:
[P](i) = [P][ϕ(i)](4.3)
where ϕ(·) is any permutation, and affiliation requires the following deter-
minental inequalities:
log
{
[P](i ∨ i′)[P](i ∧ i′)
[P](i)[P](i′)
}
≥ 0(4.4)
hold. A test of affiliation, within a symmetric environment, involves com-
paring the maximum of equation (4.1), subject to the constraints in (4.2)
and (4.3), with the maximum of equation (4.1), subject to the constraints
in (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4).
Our test of symmetric affiliation is based on the difference between the
maximum of the logarithm of the likelihood function L([Pˆ]) and the maxi-
mum of the logarithm of the likelihood function under symmetric affiliation
L([P˜]). Obviously, the sampling theory associated with the difference in
these two values of the objective function L is not straightforward because
not all of the inequality constraints required by MTP2 may hold and, from
sample to sample, the ones that do hold can change, but we shall suggest
several strategies to deal with this, below.
Experience gleaned from other models with a related structure—for ex-
ample, Wolak (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1991) as well as Bartolucci and Forcina
(2000), who investigated MTP2 in binary models—suggests that the likeli-
hood ratio (LR) statistic
2[L([Pˆ])−L([P˜])](4.5)
is not distributed according to a standard χ2 random variable.
Introducing vec[P] as a short-hand notation, for the L-vector created from
the array [P], our constrained-optimization problem can be summarized in
a notation similar to that of Wolak (1989b) as
max
vec[P]
y⊤ log(vec[P]) subject to h(vec[P])≥ 0J ,
where h :RL → RJ is the function representing all J relevant constraints
where J ≤ L and L is the total number of variables under the alternative
hypothesis. (Here, for notational parsimony, we have ignored the adding-up
condition, which is implicit.)
Consider Nδ(vec[P
0]), a neighborhood of the true value vec[P0]. De-
note by H(vec[P0]) the matrix of partial derivatives whose (i, j)-element
is ∂hi(vec[P])
∂vec[P]j
. Now, let us define the set B = {vec[P] :H(vec[P0])vec[P] ≥
0,vec[P] ∈RL}. Denote by I(vec[P0]) Fisher’s information matrix which is
defined by
lim
T→∞
T−1E[P0]
[
−
∂2L(vec[P])
∂vec[P]∂vec[P]⊤
]
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evaluated at vec[P0]. Finally, denote by
Π0 =H(vec[P0])I(vec[P0])−1H(vec[P0])⊤
the variance–covariance matrix of h(vec[Pˆ]) and by ω(j, J−j,Π0), the prob-
ability that j constraints bind, that (J − j) constraints are strictly satisfied,
that is, they are nonbinding. We have the following:
Theorem 4.1. Consider the local hypothesis testing problem
H0 : h(vec[P])≥ 0Jvec[P] ∈Nδ(vec[P
0]),
H1 : not H0.
The asymptotic distribution of the likelihood-ratio statistic satisfies the fol-
lowing property:
sup
b∈B
Pr[P0],I(vec[P0])−1(D ≥ c) = Pr[P0](D ≥ c) =
J∑
j=0
Pr(Wj ≥ c)ω(j, J−j,Π
0),
where D is the asymptotic value of the test statistic, while Wj is an inde-
pendent χ2 random variable having j degrees of freedom.
Proof. It is sufficient and straightforward to verify that the assump-
tions of Theorem 4.2 in Wolak (1989a) are satisfied. 
Because this statistic depends on the unknown population grid distribu-
tion [P0], the statistic is not pivotal. Kodde and Palm (1986) have provided
lower and upper bounds for this test statistic for tests of various sizes and
different numbers of maximal constraints.
According to Wolak (1989a), the best way to evaluate the weights is using
Monte Carlo simulation. Wolak also offered lower and upper bounds for the
probabilities above [see his equations (19) and (20), page 215]; these bounds
are based on Kodde and Palm (1986). An alternative strategy would be
to adapt the bootstrap methods of Bugni (2008) to get the appropriate
p-values of the test statistic. Yet a third strategy would be to adapt the
subsampling methods described in Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999) as was
done by Romano and Shaikh (2008).
4.1. Some comparisons with other nonparametric methods. It should be
noted, too, that our proposed estimation strategy involves nothing more than
estimating a histogram using a special class of grids. Scott [(1992), page xi]
has argued that the classical histogram “remains the most widely applied
and most intuitive nonparametric estimator.” In other words, the procedure
proposed here is not based on any unfamiliar concepts. Of course, there are
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more statistically efficient methods, but they also have limitations, as Scott
(1992) has discussed. Also, although the rate of convergence of histogram
estimation is slow, it is still reasonable; see Scott [(1992), Theorem 3.5, page
82].
Note, too, the similarities between grid-distribution and kernel-smoothed
estimators. Kernel-smoothed density estimators are well-behaved and have
good rates of convergence when the probability density functions to be es-
timated are continuously differentiable C1.4 The set C1 is dense in the set
of all probability density functions. Similarly, grid distribution estimators
are well-behaved for probability density functions in D∞ =
⋃∞
k=1D
k, which
is also a dense set in the set of all probability density functions.5 While C1
probability density functions form a familiar and well-known class probabil-
ity density functions, the probability density functions in Dk are also familiar
because they are just (a special class of) simple functions, which are funda-
mental, such as in the definition of the Lebesgue integral. When estimating
grid distributions, one has to choose k or, equivalently, the size of the bin
(1/k), which is nothing more than the bandwidth of the grid-distribution es-
timator. Similarly, kernel-smoothing requires a choice of bandwidth param-
eter, too. In sum, nonparametric estimation using either grid distributions
or smoothed kernels is very similar.
4.2. Consistency and power of the proposed test. Of course, one concern
is that k appears fixed in our analysis, but T is increasing, so our test is
potentially inconsistent. We imagine a sequence of {kT } with values increas-
ing as T increases, but not as fast as T . Below, we discuss in detail what
we have in mind. Another worry is that the test statistic will be ill-behaved
if kT tends to infinity. Thus, an upper bound k¯ must exist. This discussion
leads us to introduce the following assumption concerning f0
V
which allows
us to side-step these technical problems:
Assumption 4.1. The true data-generating process f0
V
is a grid distri-
bution, that is, there exists k¯ ∈N such that f0
V
∈Dk¯.
As the discussion above made clear, this assumption is similar to the
assumptions of smoothness concerning f0
V
which kernel-smoothing methods
require. In addition to this analogy, we offer two additional justifications for
Assumption 4.1.
4Methods exist that require fewer smoothness conditions—for example, the function
need just be continuous C0; others require additional smoothness, C2 or higher. This does
not change our claims.
5Recall that Dk is the set of grid distributions where the interval is subdivided into k
intervals, that is, Dk ≡ Tk(D).
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First, the set of grid distributions is dense in the set of all distributions:
even if the data-generating process (DGP) f0
V
were not a grid distribution,
there is a grid distribution that is arbitrarily close to it. To wit, no finite
amount of data could reject Assumption 4.1. In this sense, Assumption 4.1
is almost “no assumption.”
Second, the DGP in question is a distribution of values, which are discrete
(up to, say, dollars or cents or Yen or Won or whatever units one wants).
When one assumes a smooth probability density function, one is making an
approximation, for computational convenience: such an approximation does
not seem, to us at least, any more appealing than the one we make. On the
contrary, it seems more natural to us to assume simple probability density
functions rather than any smoothness conditions. In general, smoothness is
just a tool used to lighten the burden in the technical analysis of a particular
problem. In our case, by assuming that the distribution is simple (i.e., a grid
distribution), we can stay closer to reality.
Under Assumption 4.1, our test is consistent, for Assumption 4.1 implies
that a k exists such that f0
V
∈ Dk. Therefore, the number of inequalities
required for affiliation remains fixed. We are then in the standard framework
considered by Wolak, which has a fixed set of inequalities. Thus, consistency
follows directly from Wolak’s research. A technically sophisticated reader
may feel that our consistency result is trivial, once Assumption 4.1 is made.
The point of this paper (and this subsection, in particular) is not to provide
a technical proof of consistency, but rather to remove any doubts concerning
the consistency of our test under a reasonable assumption.
For any specific implementation, k is assumed fixed in the approximation.
In the asymptotics, we imagine kT increasing as T increases, until some
upper bound K is reached. In any application, however, if T is quite large,
not what we encounter in our application, then one can vary k, which will
potentially yield different estimates.
The power of the proposed test clearly depends on the choice of k. Were
k chosen to be one (i.e., a uniform distribution on the N -dimensional hyper-
cube), then affiliation would never be rejected. On the other hand, given a
finite sample of T observations, a large k will result in many cells having no
elements. While the choice of k is obviously important and certainly war-
rants additional theoretical investigation, perhaps along the lines of research
in time-series analysis by Guay, Guerre and Lazarova (2008) concerning op-
timal adaptive detection of correlation functions, it is beyond the scope of
this paper. In fact, in most applications to auctions, where samples are often
quite small, k will be dictated by practical considerations—viz., the relative
size of T .
4.3. Bounding the number of inequalities. For our test statistic to be
well-behaved, it is important to know that an upper bounds exists on the
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number of inequalities. For arbitrary N and k, assuming a symmetric dis-
tribution, we can construct a bound on how many inequalities there are.
Because we focus on symmetric distributions,
[f0V](i1, i2, . . . , iN ) = [f
0
V](i
′
1, i
′
2, . . . , i
′
N ),
where (i′1, i
′
2, . . . , i
′
N ) is a permutation of (i1, i2, . . . , iN ). Thus, we need only
consider sorted indices, indices (i1, i2, . . . , iN ) for which i1 ≥ i2 ≥ · · · ≥ iN .
Consider (i1, i2, . . . , iN ), a sorted index having ℓ different numbers; let r1, . . . , rℓ
denote the number of repetitions of the different numbers in (i1, i2, . . . , iN ).
Obviously, r1 + · · ·+ rℓ =N . Using this notation, the number of permuta-
tions of (i1, i2, . . . , iN ) is then
N !
r1!···rℓ!
. For instance, the index (4,3,3,2,2,2)
has 6!1!2!3! or 120 different permutations.
Given the above, we can now focus our attention to sorted indices only.
Consider the lexicographic order of them. In this way, we can attribute an
unambiguous natural number to each sorted index of length N . For example,
consider N = 3, in which case (1,1,1) corresponds to 1; (2,1,1), to 2; (2,2,1),
to 3; (3,1,1) to 5; (3,2,2), to 7; and (4,1,1) to 11. It is important to develop
an algorithm to convert a sorted index into a corresponding number, which
we describe now.
First, let us define Num(j,N) as the number of all indices that are
weakly below (in the lexicographic order) to the index (j, j, . . . , j), that is,
the index that has j in all positions and has length N . It is easy to see
that Num(1,N) = 1, because there is just one index weakly below (1,1,1,
. . . ,1) : (1,1,1, . . . ,1), itself. Also, Num(2,2) = 3, because (1,1), (2,1) and
(2,2) are the sorted indices weakly below (2,2). Similarly, Num(2,3) = 4,
because (1,1,1), (2,1,1), (2,2,1), (2,2,2) are the sorted indices weakly be-
low (2,2,2). From this argument, it is not difficult to see that Num(2,N) =
N +1. Observe, too, that Num(j,1) = j, because there are only the indexes
(1), (2), . . . , (j) weakly below (j). de Castro (2008) has proven the following:
Lemma 4.1. Num(j,N) =
(
N+j−1
j−1
)
.
Thus, if we fix the number of bidders N and the number of intervals k,
then there are M ≡Num(k,N) =
(
N+k−1
k−1
)
different indices. Affiliation will
be satisfied if the corresponding inequality is satisfied for any pair of indices
(i, i′). Since there are
(
M
2
)
or M(M−1)2 pair of such indices, it is sufficient to
test (M2 −M)/2 inequalities. Note, however, that this is an upper bound
because some inequalities are implied by others. The above discussion also
provides some guidance concerning how to choose the inequalities; however,
in an effort to conserve space, we leave the discussion of what the minimal
set of sufficient inequalities is to another paper.
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4.4. Two related papers. Like us, Li and Zhang (2008) have examined
some important economic implications of affiliation. Instead of considering
bids, however, Li and Zhang examined the entry behavior of potential bid-
ders whose signals may be affiliated. Theirs is a parametric analysis and they
implemented their test using simulation methods, examining timber sales or-
ganized by the Department of Forestry in the State of Oregon. Li and Zhang
found only a small degree of affiliation, perhaps because the zero/one entry
decision is not as informative as bid data.
Jun, Pinkse and Wan (2009) have developed a consistent nonparametric
test designed for continuous data. By avoiding discretization, Jun et al. pre-
sumably have more information than we do. On the other hand, having
rejected affiliation with their test, it is unclear what to do within their
framework because an alternative hypothesis is unspecified. In contrast, our
approach augments the theoretical work of de Castro (2008) where the al-
ternative hypothesis is clearly outlined.
4.5. Policy uses for grid distributions. de Castro (2008) has developed
a complete theoretical treatment of grid distributions, even in the absence
of affiliation.6 His idea is as follows: first, assume that f0
V
∈ Dk for some
k; that is, the DGP is a grid distribution—Assumption 4.1 holds. Standard
estimation methods (histograms) can be used to calculate [Pˆ] ∈Dk that best
approximate f0
V
.
Under de Castro’s method, one can then test whether [Pˆ] has a symmetric
MPSE. The method developed by de Castro is exact: to wit, modulo sam-
pling error, [Pˆ] has a symmetric MPSE if and only if the method detects it.
Errors can occur only in simple numerical operations such as sums, divisions
and square roots. It turns out that determining the existence of a symmetric
MPSE is nontrivial when affiliation is absent.
6de Castro’s method is too long to be described in detail here; his paper is more than
seventy pages long. In a nutshell, the method is as follows: first, it is shown that the
usual proof of uniqueness of monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium can be adapted to grid
distribution. Thus, if there is a monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium, then it is unique
and characterized by the solution to a differential equation. Also, since we consider the
symmetric case, an explicit solution is available. In the case of grid distributions, this
solution is proven to be a rational function (a quotient of polynomials). It is then shown
that in each square defining a grid distribution, it is sufficient to verify the equilibrium
inequality (optimality of following the bidding function) only with respect to a finite
number of pairs (types, bids). This step is necessary because, in principle, one needs to
check an infinite number of pairs (types, bids). The final number of points to be tested
is small (less than six) for each square. Finally, it is proven that the candidate is an
equilibrium if and only if the test is satisfied. de Castro has also provided expressions for
revenues R1
[Pˆ]
when [Pˆ] is a grid distribution.
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If [Pˆ] has a symmetric MPSE, then it can be used to calculate expected
revenues under the first- and second-price auctions, denoted R1
[Pˆ]
and R2
[Pˆ]
,
respectively. In this way, one can determine which auction format yields a
higher expected revenue for [Pˆ] and, also, the magnitude of the revenue
difference (R2
[Pˆ]
−R1
[Pˆ]
), to decide whether it is significant.7
The procedure can then be repeated using [P˜], which is obtained under
the constraint that the distribution satisfies affiliation. We know that, un-
der affiliation, a symmetric MPSE exists and that (R2
[P˜]
−R1
[P˜]
)≥ 0, but the
method also allows one to decide whether the magnitudes of the differences
(R1
[Pˆ]
−R1
[P˜]
) and (R2
[Pˆ]
−R2
[P˜]
) are economically important. It is quite pos-
sible that the expected-revenue difference between first- and second-price
auctions is nonzero, but small in economic terms, and the method allows
one to examine sampling variability by repeating the above procedures us-
ing resampled draws from [Pˆ] or [P˜]. Thus, if the estimated difference is
economically large relative to the sampling error, then this is important
information for a policy maker to know.
Thus, the grid distributions proposed in this paper have many advantages
because a theory exists that can be used for policy analysis. Such theories
have not yet been developed for other methods; if affiliation is rejected under
these methods, then what to do?
5. Empirical application. Above, in Section 3, in the tradition of the
theoretical literature concerning auctions, we developed our model of bidding
in terms of valuations for an object to be sold at auction under the first-price,
sealed-bid format. Sealed-bid tenders are often used in procurement—that is,
low-price, sealed-bid auctions at which a buyer (often a government agency)
seeks to find the lowest-cost producer of some good or service. In this section
we report results from an empirical investigation of procurement tenders for
road resurfacing by a government agency. Although it is well known that
results from auctions can be translated to procurement, and vice versa,
sometimes this translation is tedious. We direct the interested reader to the
work of de Castro and de Frutos (2010) who have developed a procedure to
translate results from auctions to procurement.
7As explained above, de Castro has shown that if a monotone, pure-strategy equilibrium
exists in a first-price auction, then it is unique. Moreover, we can obtain the underlying
distribution of values from the distribution of bids, as is typically done in the econometrics
of auctions. Although second-price auctions may have multiple equilibria, in general, in the
literature, researchers typically consider only the truthful bidding equilibrium. The truth-
telling equilibrium does not depend on the assumption of affiliation: it is an equilibrium for
any distribution. Thus, if we have the distribution of values, we also have the distribution
of bids for this equilibrium.
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We have applied our empirical framework to data from low-price, sealed-
bid, procurement auctions held by the Department of Transportation (DOT)
in the State of Michigan. At these auctions, qualified firms are invited to
bid on jobs that involve resurfacing roads in Michigan. We have chosen
this type of auction because the task at hand is quite well understood.
In addition, there are reasons to believe that firm-specific characteristics
make the private-cost paradigm a reasonable assumption; for example, the
reservation wages of owners/managers, who typically are paid the residual,
can vary considerably across firms. On the other hand, other features suggest
that the cost signals of individual bidders could be dependent, perhaps even
affiliated; for example, these firms hire other factor services in the same
market and, thus, face the same costs for inputs such as energy as well as
paving inputs. For example, suppose paving at auction t has the following
Leontief production function for bidder n:
qnt =min
(
hnt
δh
,
ynt
δy
,
znt
δz
)
,
where h denotes the managerial labor, while y and z denote other factor
inputs which are priced competitively at Wt and Xt, respectively, at auction
t. Assume that Rn, bidder n’s marginal value of time, is an independent,
private-cost draw from a common distribution. In addition, assume that the
other factor pricesWt and Xt are draws from another joint distribution, and
that they are independent of Rn. The marginal cost per mile Cnt at auction
t can be then written as
Cnt = δhRn + δyWt + δzXt,
which is a special case of an affiliated private-cost (APC) model, known as
a conditional private-cost model. The costs in this model are affiliated only
when the distribution of Rn is log-concave, which is discussed extensively
in de Castro (2007). Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) have studied this model
extensively. In short, the affiliated private-cost paradigm (APCP) seems a
reasonable null hypothesis.
We did not investigate issues relating to asymmetries across bidders be-
cause we do not know bidder identities, data necessary to implement such
a specification. Because no reserve price exists at these auctions, we treat
the number of participants as if it were the number of potential bidders and
focus on auctions at which three bidders participated. Thus, we are ignoring
the potential importance of participation costs which others, including Li
(2005), have investigated elsewhere.
The data for this part of the paper were provided by the Michigan DOT
and were organized and used by Hubbard, Li and Paarsch (2009); a complete
description of these data is provided in that paper. In Table 1 we present the
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Table 1
Sample descriptive statistics—dollars/mile: N = 3; T = 278
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Engineer’s estimate 475,544.54 491,006.52 307,331.26 54,574.41 3,694,272.59
Winning bid 466,468.63 507,025.81 286,102.57 41,760.32 3,882,524.81
All tendered bids 507,332.42 564,842.58 317,814.77 41,760.32 5,693,872.81
summary descriptive statistics concerning our sample of 834 observations—
278 auctions that involved three bidders each. We chose auctions with just
three bidders not only to illustrate the general nature of the method (if we
can do three, then we can do N ), but also to reduce the data requirements.
When we subdivide the unit hypercube into kN cells, the average number of
bids in a cell is proportional to (kN/T ). When N is very large, the sample
size must be on the order of kN in order to expect at least one observation
in each cell. This example also illustrates the potential limitations of our
approach; viz., even in relatively large samples, some of the cells will not
be populated, so k will need to be kept small. However, one can circumvent
this problem by varying the width of the subdivisions as we do below. Of
course, one must then adjust the conditions which define the determinental
inequalities. We describe this below, too.
Our bid variable is the price per mile. Notice that both the winning bids
as well as all tendered bids vary considerably, from a low of $41,760.32 per
mile to a high of $5,693,872.81 per mile. What explains this variation? Well,
presumably heterogeneity in the tasks that need to be performed. One way to
control for this heterogeneity would be to retrieve each and every contract
and then to construct covariates from those contracts. Unfortunately, the
State of Michigan cannot provide us with this information, at least not any
time soon.
How can we deal with this heterogeneity? Well, in our case, we have
an engineer’s estimate p of the price per mile to complete the project.8 We
assume that Cnt, the cost to bidder n at auction t, can be factored as follows:
Cnt = λ
0(pt)εnt,(5.1)
where λ0 is a known function. One example of this is
Cnt = ptεnt.
8Of course, besides p, it is possible that other covariates, which are common knowledge
to all the bidders, exist. If these other common-knowledge covariates exist, then we could
wrongly conclude that the signals have a strong form of correlation when, in fact, the
correctly-specified model of signals (conditioned on the common-knowledge information)
would have only small correlation. Unfortunately, we do not have access to any additional
information. Were such information available, then we would condition on it as well.
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Fig. 5. Data as well as NP, LS and LAD regressions: logarithm of bids versus logarithm
of engineer’s estimate.
Another is
Cnt = δ0p
δ1
t εnt.
Under equation (5.1), the equilibrium bid Bnt at auction t for bidder n takes
the following form:
Bnt = λ
0(pt)β(εnt),
so
Bnt
λ0(pt)
= β(εnt).
Of course, we do not know λ0, but we can estimate λ0 either parametrically,
under an appropriate assumption, or nonparametrically, using the following
empirical specification:
logBnt = ψ(pt) +Unt,
where ψ(pt) denotes − log[λ
0(pt)] and Unt denotes log[β(εnt)].
Empirical results from this exercise are presented in Figure 5. In this
figure are presented results for the nonparametric regression (NP), the least-
squares regression (LS) and the least-absolute-deviations (LAD) regression.
To get some notion of the relative fit, note that the R2 for the LS regression
is around 0.97. The LS estimates of the constant and slope coefficients are
−0.3114 and 1.0268, respectively, while LAD estimates of the constant and
slope coefficients are −0.3221 and 1.0276, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Scatterplot of transformed fitted LS residuals.
Subsequently, we took the normalized fitted residuals, which (for the LS
case) are depicted in Figure 6, and applied the methods described in Section
4 above for a k of two. Our test results are as follows: the maximum of the
logarithm of the likelihood function (minus a constant) without symmetry
was −442.50, while the maximum of the logarithm of the likelihood function
under symmetry was −444.88, and under symmetric affiliation it was also
−444.88—a total difference of 2.38.9 At size 0.05, twice the above difference
is above the lower bound provided by Kodde and Palm (1986), but below
the upper bound, so the test is inconclusive.
Because a k of two is unusually small, we introduced a symmetric, but
nonequispaced, grid distribution—like the one depicted in Figure 4, but with
intervals [0,0.4), [0.4,0.6) and [0.6,1.0]. The TP2 inequalities can be derived
in the usual way, but the adding-up inequality must be rewritten, in this
case as
a+2b+8c+8d+16e+8f +4d+2h+4i+ 4b
+ 16f +8g +8e+2g +8j +8f +16c+8i≤ 1.
Again, we applied our methods. Our test results are as follows: the maxi-
mum of the logarithm of the likelihood function (minus a constant) under
symmetry was −715.72, while the maximum under symmetric affiliation was
9The results for the LAD residuals were identical: the probability array obtained by
discretizing the LAD residuals was exactly the same as in the LS case because none of the
fitted residuals was classified differently. This is not, perhaps, surprising given the similar
fits of the two empirical specifications.
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−716.49—a difference of 0.77.10 At size 0.05, twice the above difference is
below the lower bound provided by Kodde and Palm, so we do not reject
the hypothesis of symmetric affiliation. To put these results into some con-
text, the center of the simplex had a logarithm of the likelihood function
of −916.24; using the marginal distribution of low, medium and high costs
(0.4233,0.4808,0.0959), and imposing independence yielded a logarithm of
the likelihood function of −784.67.
6. Summary and conclusions. We have constructed a tractable empirical
model of equilibrium behavior at first-price auctions when bidders’ private
valuations are dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. Subsequently, we
developed a test of affiliation and then investigated its small-sample proper-
ties. We applied our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions
used by the Michigan DOT to procure road-resurfacing: we do not reject
the hypothesis of affiliation in cost signals.
This information is potentially useful to a policy maker. The apparent
high degree of estimated affiliation also explains why low levels of observed
competition are often sufficient to maintain relatively low profit margins:
strong affiliation is akin to fierce competition. Under strong affiliation, a
potential winner knows that his nearest competitor probably has a valuation
(cost) close to his, and this disciplines his bidding behavior: he becomes more
aggressive than under independence.
Our research has other policy implications, too. As mentioned above, it is
well known that, under affiliation, the English auction format, on average,
generates more revenue for the seller than the first-price, sealed-bid format.
In procurement, under affiliation, an English or a Vickrey auction would
get the job done more cheaply than the low-price, sealed-bid format. Were
the English or Vickrey formats being used and affiliation not rejected, then
the procurement agency would be justified in its choice of mechanism. What
remains a bit of a puzzle is why the low-price, sealed-bid format is used in the
presence of such strong affiliation. Perhaps, other features, such as the ability
of the low-price, sealed-bid auction format to thwart collusion are important,
too. Alternatively, perhaps other moments of the bid distribution, such as
the variance, are important to the procurement agency.
On the other hand, had affiliation been rejected, then the procedures
described in Section 4 could be used to determine which auction format
would get the job done most cheaply, on average. Again, it is possible that
the English or Vickrey formats would still be preferred. In any case, the
methods described in Section 4 permit a better understanding of the bidding
differences, which can aid in choosing the best auction format.
10Again, the results for the LAD residuals were virtually identical: the probability array
obtained by discretizing the LAD residuals was almost the same as in the LS case.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Monte Carlo Study (DOI: 10.1214/00-AOAS344SUPP; .pdf). In this sup-
plement, we discribe a small-scale Monte Carlo study used to investigate the
numerical as well as small-sample properties of our testing strategy.
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